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Abstract 
 
Many scholars have analyzed the role of the European Union (EU) in its southern 
neighborhood by looking at the EU’s policy documents and strategies. As such, it is 
often argued that the EU is at best a useful partner in democratic reform and at 
worst an unsuccessful ‘normative power’. However, very few studies have analyzed 
the EU’s role from the recipients’ point of view: the southern neighboring countries 
themselves. This paper adopts an ‘outside-in approach’ and explores what the 
southern neighborhood countries believe the EU should be or do. On the basis of a 
set of 15 interviews with diplomats from the region and an analysis of 50 newspaper 
articles from the region on the EU’s relations with its southern neighborhood, this 
paper seeks to reveal the EU’s real ’added value’ for its southern Mediterranean 
partners. To what extent does the EU’s own perceived role in its southern 
neighborhood match the role conception of those countries? Based on the three 
case studies of Algeria, Jordan and Egypt, the paper finds that there is a clear 
divergence in role conceptions between the EU and its southern partners. While the 
EU sees itself as a ‘force for good’ and promoter of norms and democracy in the 
southern Mediterranean region, the three countries primarily believe that the EU 
perceives itself foremost as a provider of security and stability in the region, while 
they primarily expect it to act as a reliable partner for economic cooperation.  
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Introduction 
 
“The EU is not an island; it’s a part of a global community. For large parts of the world, 
the word Europe itself has become associated with a philosophy of humanity, 
solidarity and integration. Therefore the EU has to play a bigger role to work for the 
‘global common good’”, former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, Javier Solana, once said.1 Over time, the EU increasingly built up 
aspirations to play a leading role in global politics, thereby engaging in a large 
number of negotiations, cooperation schemes and conflict resolution processes with 
an increasing number of other states and actors.2 Due to its unique nature, the EU is 
often said to be a different great power and a growing part of academic research 
focuses on this subject.3 Among the questions that scholars try to answer in this 
regard are the influence of the EU in world politics (is the EU a new superpower?), its 
degree of coherence (does the Union speak with one voice?) and the qualities that 
characterize its behavior (is the EU a leader in international negotiations?).4 Most 
analyses of EU ‘actorness’ and EU foreign policy remain detached scholarly 
assessments of EU behavior over time.5 This paper takes a different approach by 
using role theory for the analysis of the positions and actions of the EU in global 
politics. Focusing on which ‘roles’ the EU is allocated when dealing with specific 
foreign policy issues can deepen and enrich our understanding of agency and 
action in European foreign policy.6 
In the case of the EU’s foreign policy towards its southern neighborhood, a lot has 
been written already on its possible role as a ‘norm promoter’, ‘provider of peace 
                                                 
1  Solana, Javier, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
“Shaping an Effective EU Foreign Policy”, speech at Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Brussels, 
24 January 2005.  
2 Comelli, Michele, Eralp, Atila & Ustün, Cigdem (eds.), The European Neigbourhood Policy 
and the Southern Mediterranean, Ankara, Middle East Technical University Press, 2009, p. 10. 
3 See Boening, Astrid, Kremer, Jan-Frederik & Van Loon, Aukje (eds.), Global Power Europe-
Vol. 1: Theoretical and Institutional Approaches to the EU's External Relations, London, 
Springer, 2013. 
4 McCormick, John, The European Superpower, London, Palgrave, 2006.  
5 Elgström, Ole, Leader or Foot-Dragger?, Stockholm, Swedish Institute for European Policy 
Studies, 2006, p. 9.  
6 Roles refer to patterns of expected, appropriate behavior. With role conceptions, we mean 
both an actor’s own considerations of its place, position and appropriate behavior vis-a-vis 
others in a given social environment and the expectations, or role prescriptions of other 
actors, as signaled through language and action. Bengtsson, Rikard & Elgström, Ole, 
“Reconsidering the European Union’s roles in international relations: self-conceptions, 
expectations, and performance”, in Harnisch, Sebastian, Frank, Cornelia & Maull, Hans (eds.), 
Role Theory in International Relations: Approaches and Analyses, London, Routledge, 2012, 
pp. 93-94; and Holsti, Kalevi, “National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy”, 
International Studies Quarterly, 14(3), 1970, pp. 238-239. 
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and stability’, etc.7 However, very few studies have analyzed this policy area from 
the recipients’ point of view: the southern neighboring countries themselves. This 
paper provides a different perspective by adopting an ‘outside-in approach’ and by 
analyzing what these third countries believe the EU should be or do instead of what 
the EU itself believes that it should be or do. As such, it tries to shed a different light on 
the EU’s ‘actorness’ and performance in its southern neighborhood and looks for the 
EU’s real ‘value added’ for its southern Mediterranean partners.  
Why study roles and the outsiders’ perceptions? 
The literature on EU foreign policy has often stressed the importance of studying 
other actors’ perceptions and expectations of EU policy.8 Bretherton and Vogler 
stated, for example, that “the relationship between internal coherence/consistency 
[...] and perceptions of the European Commission’s presence is of central 
importance”, while Laffan et al. believe that “the Union forms a highly significant 
presence in the perceptions and actions both of its members and of outsiders”.9 Yet, 
despite the fact that many observers have underlined the necessity of probing what 
expectations and images actors outside the EU have of its foreign policy, very little 
empirical research has been carried out in this area.10 This study is an attempt to help 
fill this void by providing three case studies on one of the most important EU foreign 
policy areas: the Union’s relations with its southern neighborhood. Studying the 
external perceptions of EU actions and policies is also of great importance for three 
other reasons. First of all, they are a source of knowledge of EU foreign policy as they 
are “important indicators of how well intentions have been translated into 
observable actions”, thereby “providing insights into how the EU is actually judged as 
an international actor”.11 Secondly, as foreign policy roles are created through a 
continuous interaction between own role conceptions and structurally based 
expectations, studying the outsiders’ perceptions helps understand the EU’s foreign 
                                                 
7 See for example Comelli, Michele, “The impact of the changes in the Arab world on the 
Southern dimension of the ENP”, International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, XX(2), 
2011, pp. 54-70; Bengtsson, Rikard, “Constructing Interfaces: The Neighbourhood Discourse in 
EU External Policy”, Journal of European Integration, 30(5), 2008, pp. 597-616; Hollis, Rosemary, 
“No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the ‘Arab Spring’”, International 
Affairs, 88(1), 2012, pp. 81-94. 
8 Elgström, op. cit., p. 11. 
9 Bretherton, Charlotte & Vogler, John, The European Union as a Global Actor, London, 
Routledge, 1999, p. 45; Laffan, Brigid, Smith, Michael & O’Donnell, Rory, Europe’s Experimental 
Union: Rethinking Integration, London, Routledge, 2000, p. 171. 
10 Elgström, op. cit., p. 11. 
11 Rhodes, Carolyn, “Introduction: The identity of the European Union in International Affairs”, 
in Rhodes, Carolyn (ed.), The European Union in the World Community, London, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 6. 
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policy identity. 12  Thirdly, the outsiders’ expectations and perceptions equally 
influence the impact of EU foreign policy role performance. 13  Whether policy 
initiatives taken by the EU reach their goals, are seen to be legitimate, effective and 
consistent, is at least partly determined by the images and expectations that the 
recipients of that particular policy action have. Thus, studying how the EU is viewed 
abroad helps us to better understand its role and effectiveness as a foreign policy 
actor. 
Research design 
By utilizing role theory as well as the ‘outside-in approach’,14 the following three 
interrelated issues are investigated and critically assessed: (1) the constitutive 
elements of the EU’s own role conception, (2) the role conception of the EU’s 
southern neighbors on what the EU does or should do in the region, and (3) the 
possible mismatch of roles that might occur when comparing the different 
perspectives on the EU’s role in its southern neighborhood. The paper addresses the 
following research question: To what extent does the EU’s own perceived role in its 
southern neighborhood match the role conception that those Mediterranean 
countries have for the EU?  
After first readings and introductory interviews with relevant EU policy makers and 
academics, it became clear that the EU’s own perceived role in its southern 
neighborhood is one of a ‘norms promoter’ rather than anything else. This is very 
much in line with Ian Manners’ ‘Normative Power Europe’ argument and different 
from the roles that other international actors pursue in Northern Africa and the 
Middle East. 15  However, although the EU stresses the normative role in policy 
documents and official statements, its southern partners who are the recipients of this 
policy may perceive the EU’s role quite differently.  
Since it is not feasible for the purpose of this paper to study in depth the role 
conception of the EU and its ten southern partners, three case studies are selected: 
                                                 
12  Elgström, Ole & Smith, Michael, The European Union’s Roles in International Politics. 
Concepts and analysis, London, Routledge, 2006; and Aggestam, Lisbeth, “Role theory and 
European foreign policy”, in Elgström, Ole & Smith, Michael (eds.), The European Union’s Roles 
in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis, London, Routledge, 2006, pp. 11-29. 
13 Role performance is the actual policy behavior of the actor in this social context (cf. 
Bengtsson & Elgström, op. cit., p. 94) and will be operationalized by looking at the coherence, 
efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU’s actions in the southern neighborhood. 
14 This in line with Keukeleire’s ‘outside-in approach’: Keukeleire, Stephan, “Lessons for EU 
Diplomacy from an Outside-in Perspective”, in Sieglinde Gstöhl & Erwan Lannon (eds.), The 
Neighbours of the EU’s Neighbours: Diplomatic and Geopolitical Dimensions beyond the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, Farnham, Ashgate, (forthcoming). 
15 Manners, Ian, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 40(2), 2002, pp. 235–258. 
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Algeria, Egypt and Jordan. First of all, by selecting these countries, both the Mashreq 
(Jordan) as well as the Maghreb (Algeria) countries are covered.16 Secondly, Jordan 
is a country which is very optimistic and cooperative about EU foreign policy – most 
notably the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) –, while Algeria is (a lot) less. 
Thirdly, Egypt is a country which is currently undergoing a drastic domestic 
transformation as a direct consequence of the Arab Spring.  
In order to provide an answer to the research question, the following methodological 
approach was applied: First, 15 expert interviews with relevant policy makers from 
the EU (4 interviews), as well as diplomats from the southern neighborhood countries 
based in Brussels (4 interviews) or in their country of origin (7 interviews) were 
conducted. These interviews were semi-structured, lasted on average one hour and 
provided valuable insights on how exactly both sides see the role of the EU in its 
southern neighborhood.17 The total number of interviewees was obviously limited, but 
the validity of the results are strengthened by the fact that the diplomats/experts 
from the same countries/organization, had more or less the same perceptions on the 
EU’s role(s) and stressed similar strengths and weaknesses. Secondly, a brief review of 
the current press coverage on EU-southern neighborhood relations and the related 
role conception was conducted by collecting, analyzing and comparing 50 media 
articles written by southern Mediterranean news agencies. For that, 17 Egyptian, 17 
Algerian and 16 Jordanian newspaper articles were randomly selected, and this from 
at least three different independent (online) news agencies for each country in the 
period of 2011-2014. This data was then inserted into an online qualitative data 
analysis tool called ‘Dedoose’ which allows comparing the different points of views.18  
In what follows we first describe the EU external policy towards these countries and 
the EU’s own perceived role. This is then contrasted with the outsiders’ point of view.  
The EU’s interaction with its southern neighborhood 
This section seeks to provide an overview of the evolution and current framework of 
EU-southern neighborhood interactions. Consequently, a general role conception of 
the EU for its southern neighborhood is then deducted and tested in three case 
studies. 
                                                 
16 The Palestinian Authority and Israel are special cases given their unique relationships with 
the EU. Lebanon, Libya and Syria should also be dealt with separately, as they were recently 
(or still are) involved in an armed conflict/civil war which requires the EU to adopt a 
considerably different approach than it does towards the other Arab countries. 
17 This means that they were centered on a limited number of basic questions but left some 
room for the respondents to elaborate and choose direction themselves. 
18 www.dedoose.com.  
Joren Selleslaghs 
8 
EU-southern neighborhood relations: evolution and current framework 
The EU’s approach towards its southern neighborhood is characterized by a plethora 
of initiatives, institutional set-ups and programs, as proximity is one of the cornerstones 
of the EU’s relations with the region. 19  At the nearest point, only 14 kilometers 
separate the EU from the Arab world (between Spain and Morocco), making the 
region a ‘first frontier’ to Europe. But Europe’s colonial past in the region and its 
economic interdependence also considerably influence the relationship. Whereas 
the EU is a major trading partner for its southern neighbors (almost 50% of total Arab 
trade and 65% of total Maghreb trade), the EU especially relies on the region’s 
energy supply.20 As such, 20.4% of the EU’s oil imports and between 22-25% of its total 
gas imports originate from the Arab world, which is set to increase even further in 
light of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the crisis in eastern Ukraine.21  
Next to their geographic, historical and economic ties, both regions are also 
intertwined politically and geo-strategically. One of the main goals of the EU in its 
direct southern neighborhood is to achieve peace and stability, or to create a 
“stable and prosperous neighborhood”.22 The EU does as much as possible to stop 
the “export of instability” and the influx of illegal migrants, much to the frustration of 
(some of) its southern partners.23  
This leads to what is arguably the most important driving force or rationale of the EU’s 
programs and projects towards its southern neighborhood: the promotion of 
democratic reforms and human rights since the EU believes that this will help 
decrease the instability and ‘under-development’ of the region.24 As such, it is often 
                                                 
19 These are the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (1995), the European Neighborhood Policy 
(2004) and the Union for the Mediterranean (2008). However, there are other relevant 
initiatives and frameworks such as the Global Mediterranean Policy (1972-1992), the renewed 
Mediterranean policy (1992-1995), the ‘5+5’ initiative (1990) or the Franco-Egyptian initiative 
called Forum of the Mediterranean (1992). See Khader, Bichara, “The European Union and 
the Arab World: from the Rome Treaty to the Arab Spring”, PAPERSIEMed, 17, 2013. 
20 Ibid., p. 3. The non-oil producing Arab countries export mainly agricultural products, basic 
industrial products, raw materials etc. 
21 For a full account of possible implications that the turmoil in Ukraine in 2014 might have, see 
Ratner, Michael et al., “Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas 
Supply Diversification”, Congressional Research Service, US Congress, Washington D.C., 2013.  
22 European Union, “Regulation (EC) NO 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 October 2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument”, Official Journal of the European Union, L310, 9 
November 2006, pp. 1-14. 
23 Boulding, Kenneth, “Moving from Unstable to Stable Peace”, retrieved 19 March 2014, 
http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/pdfs/boulding.pdf. 
24 Boubakri, Amor & Lindahl, Susanne, “The European Union and challenges to democracy 
building in the Arab world”, in Helgesen, Vidar (ed.), Democracy in Development: Global 
consultations on the EU’s role in democracy building, Stockholm, International IDEA, 2009, p. 
66. 
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stated that whereas “the Arab world is perceived in Europe as the nearest 
difference, Europe sees itself as the nearest reference”, leading the EU to adopt an 
approach similar to a “mission civilisatrice”.25  
The EU’s role conception in its southern neighborhood  
This section investigates how the EU sees itself in the region.26 Based on interviews with 
EU officials, it is argued that the EU sees itself as a promoter/supporter of structural, 
democratic and economic reform in its southern neighborhood.27  
Figure 1: The EU’s own role conception in its southern neighborhood  
  
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
Figure 1 reveals that, above all, the EU sees itself in the role of pushing for democratic 
reforms in its southern neighborhood. It shows which four roles were generally 
attributed to the EU: The bigger their share of the pie, the more often they were 
referred to by the interviewees. Three main arguments were put forward:28 First, the 
emphasis on structural political and economic reforms clearly frames the EU’s role 
across the Mediterranean basin. The EU even makes (further) financial and technical 
cooperation conditional on the reforms that its partner countries undergo, which 
illustrates its intended role as a ‘norm promoter/supporter’. Second, through the 
expectations of the partner countries that see the EU as an ‘anchor of stability and 
modernization’, the EU is equally set to lead those countries through the necessary 
                                                 
25  Paris, Roland, “International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice’”, Review of 
International Studies, 28(4), 2002, pp. 637-656. 
26  See Panebianco, Stefania, “The constraints on EU action as a ‘norm exporter’ in the 
Mediterranean”, in Elgström, Ole & Smith, Michael (eds.), The European Union’s Roles in 
International Politics, Concepts and Analysis, New York, Routledge, pp. 136-354. 
27 Four officials from the European External Action Service were interviewed; see the list in the 
bibliography. 
28 See also Elgström, Ole & Smith, Michael (eds.), The European Union’s Roles in International 
Politics: Concepts and Analysis, London, Routledge, 2006. 
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reforms in order to achieve stability and prosperity.29 The EU is even seen as “the 
greatest contribution to sustainable stability and security on the European 
continent”30 and serves as a “pole of attraction for our region—countries along our 
borders who actively seek closer relations with us”.31 Third, when looking closely at 
the EU’s intentions towards the Mediterranean region, one can find arguments as 
well for the so called ‘civilizing’ element of the ‘normative great power’ role.32 As 
such, the EU seeks “to export its ideals and practices to outside parties against the 
background of the perceived success of the EU, the need in the neighborhood for 
further security and welfare, and the moral obligation of the EU to help out”.33  
From the analysis above one can thus conclude that the overarching aim of the EU’s 
interaction with its direct southern neighbors is to ensure peace and stability. It is 
believed that by promoting a specific set of norms and values and supporting the 
North African and Middle Eastern countries to adapt their political and economic 
systems accordingly, sustainable peace and security will be achieved. The next 
section looks at how the EU’s southern neighbors perceive the EU’s role, and 
contrasts the outcome with the findings of this section.  
Different role conceptions? Bringing the outsiders’ perspective in 
As there is only very limited academic literature available on the perceptions the 
partner countries have of the role of the EU, this section is mostly based on empirical 
research. More than ten expert interviews with diplomats originating from Jordan, 
Egypt and Algeria were conducted, and 10 articles from Algerian, Egyptian and 
Jordanian newspapers were studied with the aim of tracing these countries’ 
perceptions on what the EU’s role in its southern neighborhood is or should be.34  
The EU in the eyes of Jordan: a provider of financial and technical support 
rather than a normative great power 
 
Jordan officially entertains relations with the EU since 1977 and is included in most of 
the EU cooperation frameworks with the region. 35  Jordan always sought close 
                                                 
29 Ferrero-Waldner, Benita, “The EU in the World”, European Policy Centre, Brussels, 2006. 
30 Prodi, Romano, President of the European Commission, “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy 
as the key to stability”, Speech/02/619, Brussels, 6 December 2002. 
31  Landaburu, Eneko, “From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy: are there concrete 
alternatives to enlargement?”, speech, CEPS Conference “Revitalising Europe”, Brussels, 23 
January 2006, p. 5. 
32 Bicchi, Federica, “Our size fits all: normative power Europe and the Mediterranean”, Journal 
of European public policy, 13(2), 2006, pp. 286-303. 
33 Bengtsson, Rikard & Elgström, Ole, “Conflicting Role Conceptions? The European Union in 
Global Politics”, Foreign Policy Analysis, 8(1), 2012, p. 96. 
34 See the list in the bibliography. 
35 More specifically, it is part of the EMP, ENP and UfM. 
BRIGG Paper 4/2014 
 11 
relations with the EU and currently holds an ‘advanced status’ within the ENP 
framework, a level of cooperation that only few southern ENP countries enjoy. The 
launch of negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) in 
2012 also points in the direction of a true dedication on the Jordanian side to an 
increasing interaction and interdependence with the EU.36 But do the Jordanians 
share the EU’s own role conception for the region? Figure 2 shows how, according to 
the Jordanian interviewees and written press, the EU sees itself.   
Figure 2: The EU’s role conception from a Jordanian point of view37 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
Figure 2 shows that the Jordanians think quite similarly about the EU’s own role 
conception, namely that it sees itself as a supporter/promoter for reform and the 
preservation of peace and stability in the country. However, they feel that the EU is 
pushing (slightly) more for guaranteeing peace and security in the region than it is 
promoting all kinds of reforms (be it economic or democratic). This is due to two 
reasons: Jordan is first of all seen as a strategic partner in the Middle East Peace 
Process (MEPP) and a strong supporter of a comprehensive two-state solution as, 
next to Egypt, it is the only Arab country that signed a peace treaty with Israel.38 
Therefore, Jordan is of strategic importance for the EU’s efforts to come to a solution 
in the MEPP and the EU will do what it can (from political support to financial and 
technical assistance) in order to keep the Jordanian approach in line with its own 
                                                 
36 Also, in In November 2008 Jordan submitted a paper on “Upgrading of Jordan-EU relations” 
to the EU- Jordan Association Council. In that paper it expressed the desire to come to a 
qualitative and quantitative intensification of its relations with the EU. For more, see Pirolli, 
Milena, EU and Jordan: Beyond the ENP Action Plan, Amman, Center for Strategic Studies of 
the University of Jordan. 
37 By “Total Jordan” we mean the sum of the results of the analysed interviews as well as the 
press articles.  
38  Stewart, Dona, Good neighbourly relations: Jordan, Israel and the 1994-2004 peace 
process, London, IB Tauris & Company, 2007. 
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strategy.39 Secondly, the Jordanians also assume that the EU wants Jordan to stay 
“the Ark of Noah in the High Seas of the Middle East”.40 For that, it is reported that the 
EU has its programs and funds oriented around security-related themes, and more 
specifically around the issue of refugees originating from unstable neighbors such as 
Lebanon (especially with the outbreak of the war in 2006) and Syria (which is in civil 
war since 2011).41 In order not to derail the whole region because of spill-over effects 
of violent conflicts in Jordan’s neighboring countries, it is argued that the EU sees itself 
as a great supporter of Jordan’s hosting of large numbers of refugees.42 Indeed, the 
EU has already dedicated more than €2 billion to the Syrian crisis, thereby making 
“the Union the world’s largest donor in this regard” vis-à-vis Jordan.43  
But the Jordanians equally underline the EU’s own perceived normative role. It is 
argued that the EU is ready to support Jordan on its path to reform because “a 
strong, democratic Jordan is not only an asset for its people, but also to its European 
neighbors and friends and to the world”. 44 Especially in the written press, many 
references are made to various statements by EU officials on how and why Jordan 
should reform. Next to this, detailed overviews of the EU’s financial envelopes are 
also reported as to make a stronger case for the EU’s own perceived role as a ‘force 
of good’ or reform promoter/supporter to Jordan by showing that a substantial 
amount of money goes to this kind of projects. 
Now, is this what the Jordanians truly want from the EU? Do they share this role 
conception or do they have other expectations from the EU? Figure 3 visualizes how 
the Jordanian diplomats as well as the written press feel about EU-Jordan relations 
and how they should, in their view, be. 
                                                 
39 With the Mubarak regime no longer in power, Jordan is becoming more and more a 
strategic partner for the EU (and the US). Also see Jonasson, Ann-Kristin, Common Values? 
Perspectives on the Jordan-EU Political Dialogue, PhD dissertation, University of Gothenburg, 
2013. 
40 Interview with Akram Ali Hayajneh, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan, Brussels, 10 April 2014. 
41 Think in this regard also about the influx of Iraqi and Palestinian refugees. For more see 
Refugees International, “Jordan”, retrieved on 21 March 2014, 
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/where-we-work/middle-east/jordan. 
42 European External Action Service, “EU/Jordan Action plan”, Brussels, 2013.  
43 Omari, Raed, “EU allocates 180m euros to assist Jordan”, Jordan Times, 26 November 2013. 
44 Thereby quoting the EU’s ambassador to Jordan, see Delegation of the European Union to 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, “EU bolsters its support to reformers in its Southern and 
Eastern neighbourhoods”, press conference, 15 May 2012, Amman.  
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Figure 3: Jordanian role expectations regarding the EU 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
Figure 3 shows that the EU’s self-proclaimed role for Jordan is not fully shared by the 
Jordanians. As a matter of fact, Jordan sees the EU as a provider of technical and 
financial support rather than anything else. The EU’s role of providing support to 
Jordan’s quest for peace and stability, both domestically and regionally, is only of 
secondary importance. It was also stated that Jordan seeks the support or political 
recognition of the EU in its foreign policy, most notably in the MEPP but also as ‘a 
partner in ensuring domestic security and stability’, especially in light of the large 
influx of Syrian refugees. It is calculated that in March 2014 almost 10% of the total 
Jordanian population were Syrian refugees, which put serious pressure on the 
country’s healthcare, education and water management systems. 45 The refugee 
camps in Jordan are currently among the world’s largest refugee facilities. Therefore, 
Jordan strongly hopes that the EU continues (and increases) its support, both 
financially as well as technically in order to be able to provide a decent shelter to 
the almost one million refugees.46  
But it is not only in the area of security that Jordan seeks political support and 
financial and technical assistance from the EU. As Jordan is a small and resource-
poor country, it imports almost 96% of its energy supply from abroad.47 Furthermore, 
the Kingdom suffers from great water scarcity as its available resources are 
                                                 
45 Syrian refugees, “Jordan”, retrieved on 24 March 2014, http://syrianrefugees.eu. 
46 This number is contested though; some argue it is ‘only’ 600‘000. The Zatari camp is the 
biggest refugee camp with 120‘000 people. Ibid. 
47  Khammash, Tanya, “the Jordanian Energy Sector”, retrieved on 14 April 2014, 
http://jordinvest.com.jo/uploads/documents/energy-sector-report-12-12-2012.pdf. 
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diminishing at a very fast pace.48 In order to tackle these challenges, Jordan wants 
to transform its economy into a sustainable and resource-efficient model economy 
and seeks to invest heavily in renewable energies. 49  But Jordan lacks sufficient 
funding and the technological expertise to achieve this goal. Therefore, the 
Jordanian government asks the EU for support in this area by means of an increase in 
the macro-financial assistance and accompanying national indicative program 
packages, as well as the number of twinning projects similar to the two recently 
launched projects on the improvement of (economic) statistical data and the 
competitiveness of the telecommunications sector.50 
It can thus be concluded that Jordan acknowledges the EU’s self-proclaimed role as 
a partner for democratic reform, but it does not necessarily share this conception. 
What the Jordanians truly expect from the EU is technical and financial support to 
make the economy grow and to ensure stability in the neighborhood rather than 
anything else. Is this also the case for EU- Egypt relations?  
The EU’s role in Egypt according to the Egyptians: a partner for socio-
economic growth and welfare 
 
Egypt is the largest country in the region with a population of almost 80 million 
inhabitants, of which around 8 million live in its capital Cairo, the biggest city in the 
Arab world. Official relations between the EU and Egypt go back as early as 1966.51 
EU-Egypt relations are mostly conducted within the framework of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), as 
Egypt’s participation in the ENP framework has been more ambiguous. The first EU-
Egypt ENP Action Plan was only adopted in 2007 after almost four years of 
cumbersome negotiations. The implementation of this Action Plan, especially in terms 
of reforms, remains limited, as the Egyptians seem to be more and more opposed to 
any “interference of Brussels”. 52  How can we explain this ambiguous Egyptian 
                                                 
48  Rico, Mariona, “Water in the Middle East: The Need for Cooperation”, in IEMed 
Mediterranean Yearbook, Barcelona, 2010, p. 190.  
49  See Greenpeace, “Jordan’s Future Energy”, retrieved on 4 April 2014, 
http://www.greenpeace.org/arabic/PageFiles/481146/Jordan_Report2013.pdf. 
50 The EU has allocated a total of €265 million to Jordan for the 2007-2010 NIP, new programs 
launched in 2011 also included: capacity-building in wind energy and solar power (€10 
million); support to the reform on employment, technical and vocational training (€35 million); 
democratic governance (€10 million); water for low income communities (€10 million); and 
local economic development (€10 million). For more, see European Commission, “The EU and 
Jordan: long-standing relationship”, MEMO/12/124, Brussels, 2012. 
51 Comelli, Michele, “Dynamics and Evolution of the EU-Egypt Relationship within the ENP 
Framework”, Instituto Affari Internazionali, IAI1002, 2010. 
52 Ibid., see also Zafar, Shaista, “Contemporary EU-Egypt Relations within the Parameters of 
the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership programme and ENP”, Journal of European Union 
Studies, 13(2), 2011, pp. 98-118. 
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position towards the EU? Studying the different views on the EU’s possible role for 
Egypt helps understanding the issue. As argued above, the EU sees itself first and 
foremost as a norm promoter and supporter of democratic reform in its southern 
neighborhood, including for Egypt. But do the Egyptians share this view?  
Figure 4: The EU’s role conception from an Egyptian point of view 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
Figure 4 shows what the interviewed Egyptian diplomats, as well as the written press, 
believe how the EU sees itself. Most of them acknowledged that the EU’s emphasis 
has, in general, been on supporting democratic reform in Egypt. As such, various 
statements delivered by EU officials, including the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, but also EU Foreign Ministers, were often 
quoted to demonstrate the EU’s self-proclaimed role as a norm defender in Egypt.53 
Amongst those quotes are general messages such as “the EU reaffirms the 
importance of its relationship with Egypt and the continued support it gives to the 
Egyptian people in their desire to establish a democratic and prosperous society”.54 
But also critical views are reported on how the EU sees itself as a ‘force of good’:  
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt said: ‘What we have seen is a deterioration of 
the situation in Egypt during the past few months.’ He raised concerns regarding 
the ‘deterioration in terms of human rights, deterioration in terms of the political 
space [...] and the rise of terrorism and violence.’ He was also concerned over 
the ‘banning of the Muslim Brotherhood’ and the arrests of political activists. Bildt 
added: ‘All of this goes hand in hand and is not a good thing’.55 
                                                 
53 High Representative Catherine Ashton highlighted, for example, the need to follow the 
roadmap “in terms of elections and to try and be as inclusive as possible in terms of bringing 
all Egyptian people who support democracy and who support the future of Egypt into the 
political framework”, whereas British Foreign Secretary William Hague stated: “In Egypt we 
want for a democratic transition to succeed, but for a democratic transition to succeed, it’s 
important that the rights of media freedom are upheld.” See “EU foreign ministers discuss 
Egypt”, Al Ahram Weekly, 13 February 2014. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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Next to reporting on the EU’s self-perceived role as a norm promoter in Egypt, the 
interviewees and newspaper articles also referred to the EU’s own role conception of 
a partner for ensuring stability and security in Egypt. Four items were reported to be in 
the minds of the Europeans in this case: illegal immigration, countering (the rise of) 
terrorism, regional conflicts in which Egypt could play a (major) role, the MEPP and 
the Syrian crisis.56 Especially with regard to combatting illegal immigration, the EU 
sees a major role for itself, with regard to stopping the migrants coming from as well 
as transiting through Egypt with the destination of Europe.57  
But what role do the Egyptians themselves attribute to the EU? Figure 5 shows what 
Egyptians see as the true added value of the EU. 
Figure 5: The Egyptian role expectations regarding the EU 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
As Figure 5 clearly indicates, the Egyptians do not see or want the EU as a norm 
provider and advocate of democratic reform, 58 Instead, they see the EU as an 
economic and trade partner and wish to further increase these interactions to make 
the Egyptian economy grow. By strengthening the economic relations with the EU, a 
more favorable economic climate would be created by restoring economic stability 
and thereby providing the necessary confidence for foreigners to invest (again) in 
Egypt. As the EU is currently the biggest trade partner for Egypt, increasing the trade 
                                                 
56 Equally see the EU-Egypt Action Plan, European External Action Service, “EU/Egypt Action 
Plan”, Brussels, 2007. 
57 This via closer military cooperation, exchange of maritime information, but also through 
negotiating readmission agreements with Egypt and other countries. For more, see Albrecht, 
Hans-Jörg, “Fortress Europe? Controlling Illegal Immigration”, European Journal of Crime 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 2002, 10(1), pp. 1-22. 
58 See also Comelli, Michele & Paciello, Maria, “The ENP’s potential for reform in the Southern 
Mediterranean: a Cost/Benefit Analysis”, in Comelli, Michele, Eralp, Atila & U ̈stün, Cigdem 
(eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Southern Mediterranean: Drawing from 
the Lessons of Enlargement, Ankara, Middle East Technical University Press, 2009, pp. 53-77.  
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with the Union would be very beneficial and create more job opportunities for 
Egyptians.59  
Although closer economic and trade relations are a priority for Egypt, the Egyptians 
see the role of the EU in this field rather differently compared to how the EU has 
behaved so far. According to the interviewees the EU’s conditions of liberalization 
and privatization for more trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), has only led to 
a net loss in growth of the fragile Egyptian economy. 60  Trade and economic 
cooperation should instead focus on capacity building, training, energy, 
transportation, education, proper water management, enhancing competitiveness, 
etc.61 Only then the EU could truly fulfill the role that Egypt expects from it: to be a 
reliable partner for socio-economic growth in Egypt as to increase the welfare and 
prosperity of all Egyptians. 
Like the Jordanians, the Egyptians also have a clear and correct understanding of 
how the EU sees itself acting in its southern neighborhood. But also similar to the 
Jordanians, the Egyptians see another role for the EU than the way it is acting right 
now. For Egypt, closer economic and trade relations with the Union are of top priority 
to ensure socio-economic growth. The EU should therefore organize its programs and 
interaction differently so that they all serve this end goal, rather than trying to 
promote a specific set of norms and values. Is this also the case for Algeria? Do the 
Algerians agree with the EU’s self-proclaimed role for the country? 
The EU’s prime role for Algeria: being a number one energy market  
The EU’s only southern neighbor which has formally refused to join the ENP framework 
is Algeria. Relations between Algeria and the EU officially started in 1976 with the 
signature of a cooperation agreement but have especially taken shape through the 
Barcelona Process in the 1990s. By joining the EMP, Algeria wanted to come out of its 
international political and economic isolation as a consequence of its civil war in the 
early 1990s.62 But even though socio-economic interaction and diplomatic relations 
between the EU and Algeria expanded gradually through the Barcelona Process, 
Algeria officially refused to join the ENP in 2004 and was very skeptical when French 
                                                 
59 Bayoumi, op. cit., pp. 6-11. 
60 This is also confirmed by various scholars. See for example Al-Iriani, Mahmoud & Al-Shamsi 
Fatima, Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in the GCC Countries: A Causality 
Investigation Using Heterogeneous Panel Analysis, paper, Al-Ain, Department of Economics, 
United Arab Emirates University, p. 5.  
61 Korany, Bahgat & El-Mahdi, Rabab, The Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012. 
62 Boumghar, Lotfi, “The Algerian Position on the European Neighbourhood Policy”, in IEMed, 
Mediterranean Yearbook 2013, Girona, Iemed, 2013, pp. 207-209. 
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President Sarkozy invited it to join the UfM.63 Four reasons are at the basis of this 
refusal: First, Algeria heavily criticized the way in which the ENP was created, as there 
was no prior consultation of, nor proper communication towards the potential 
partners. Creating a true spirit of partnership between both sides of the 
Mediterranean therefore becomes impossible for the Algerians. As the ENP 
framework would be dominated by “European hegemony” it truly was considered 
unacceptable to Algeria.64 Second, the way in which the ENP operates, namely 
through the ‘more for more’ principle and political conditionality was also not 
accepted by Algeria because it appeared as “the expression of a hackneyed view 
of relations between Europe and the South shore of the Mediterranean in which one 
party assumes the lovely role of sermonizer and distributor of brownie points to unruly 
pupils who need to be set back on the right track”.65 Third, due to historical reasons, 
Algeria is very sensitive to issues of sovereignty and interference in domestic affairs.66 
As such, the country does not accept that the EU would be involved in domestic 
politics and ask for a specific set of reforms. Fourth, Algeria considered the ENP too 
much of a ‘one-size fits all’ policy framework, taking each country’s specific needs 
too little into account. Furthermore, by putting all countries under one umbrella, the 
EU would ignore the regional dynamics at play, most notably between Algeria and 
Morocco, which equally hinder an effective framework of cooperation.67  
Which role do the Algerians see for the EU in the region and how do they think that 
the EU sees itself in the region? 
 
                                                 
63 Darbouche, Hakim, “Energising EU–Algerian Relations”, The International Spectator, 45(3), 
2010, pp. 71-83. 
64 Ibid., p. 74. Moreover, the reservations expressed by Algeria can also be at least partially 
explained by the fact that it is less financially dependent on the EU than the other southern 
neighboring countries.  
65 Darbouche, op. cit., p. 207. 
66 See Boubekeur, Amel, “Energy supplier or political partner? Algeria’s marginalization and 
opportunities in EU policies”, in Comeli, Michele, Eralp, Atila & Ustün, Cigdem, The European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Southern Mediterranean, Ankara, Middle East Technical 
University Press, 2009, pp. 99-118. 
67 Morocco-Algeria relations are tense because of the Western Sahara issue, making it difficult 
to cooperate. See Darbouche, Hakim, “Decoding Algeria's ENP policy: differentiation by 
other means?”, Mediterranean Politics, 13(3), 2008, pp. 371-389. 
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Figure 6: The EU’s role conception from an Algerian point of view 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
Interestingly, and in contrast to the Egyptians and Jordanians, the Algerians do not 
think that the EU’s main self-proclaimed role for Algeria is one of a partner in 
democratic reform or a norm promoter. Instead, Figure 6 shows that according to 
the Algerian diplomats and written press, the EU sees itself first and foremost as a 
partner in security and stability in Algeria. Two main arguments provide the basis for 
this role conception according to the Algerians. First of all, as most of the illegal 
migrants still come from the Maghreb countries, the EU feels that it should step up its 
efforts to support the Algerians in tackling the issue and removing the related security 
threats.68 Next to that, the Algerians also believe that the EU fears a repetition of the 
1990s scenario and all the possible repercussions for Europe related to that. 69 
Therefore, the EU has a strong interest in supporting Algeria in its attempts to counter 
terrorism and the radicalization of Islamist parties. 
The interviewees also indicated that the EU seeks to collaborate with Algeria in order 
to ensure security and stability in and with its neighboring countries.70 In addition, the 
role of the EU as the main importer of Algerian oil and gas is, especially in the written 
press, emphasized on a regular basis. Algeria accounts for 30% of all EU gas imports, 
a share which is also set to rise in light of the Ukrainian and Russian turmoil.71 But does 
this reflection on how the EU sees its own role mirror the Algerian role expectations? 
What would be the true added value of the EU according to Algerians themselves? 
                                                 
68  See Joffe, George, “The European Union, democracy and counter‐terrorism in the 
Maghreb”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(1), 2008, pp. 147-171. 
69  Pierre, Andrew & Quandt, William, The Algerian crisis: policy options for the West, 
Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996. 
70 See Francis, David, “The regional impact of the armed conflict and French intervention in 
Mali”, Norwegian Peace building Resource Centre, Oslo, 2013; and Dennison, Susi, “The EU, 
Algeria and the northern Mali question”, ECFR policy memo, 69, 2012. 
71 Ibid. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Total
Interviews
Algeria
Total
newspapers
Algeria
Total Algeria
EU Democratic
Reform
EU Economics and
Trade
EU Security and
Stability
Joren Selleslaghs 
20 
Figure 7: Algerian role expectations regarding the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
Figure 7 illustrates that Algerians do not see a role for the EU in guiding their country 
to (democratic) reforms, nor in the provision of peace and stability. Instead, the EU is 
mostly seen as an important trading partner as well as a provider of technical 
expertise. As a matter of fact, the EU is Algeria’s most important gas and oil 
consumer. Its revenues account for 97-98% of all export revenues and no less than 
75% of the national budget revenues.72 For Algeria, the EU is thus of utmost economic 
importance and it seeks closer energy cooperation. In order to increase its energy 
supply to Europe, Algeria needs to improve its infrastructures and acquire the right 
technology. The EU could help in achieving this goal. The European Commission’s 
National Indicative Program for Algeria already includes specific projects to address 
this ‘wish’ from Algeria, but the allocated budget and efforts are far from sufficient.73 
Finally, Algeria also seeks technical experience and expertise in other sectors 
(including education, telecommunications, agricultural sector and water 
management) in which the EU could be of a true added value too.74  
Whereas both Jordan and Egypt acknowledge the EU’s self-proclaimed role of a 
norm promoter/defender for the region, the Algerian interviewees and written press 
see it differently. For them, the EU believes first and foremost having a role in to 
ensuring peace and security in the country. However, Algeria does not support this 
self-proclaimed role conception and expects the EU to do something different for 
the country. For Algeria, the EU should make sure that the trade and economic 
relations between the two partners be assured and increased as much as possible, 
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
73 European Commission, “Instrument Européen de voisinage et de partenariat, Algérie 2011-
2013”, Brussels, 2011. 
74 See in this regard also Migdalovitz, Carol, Algeria: Current Issues, Washington D.C., DIANE 
Publishing, 2011.  
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especially in the field of energy. Thus, also in this third case study, one can speak of a 
role mismatch between the two partners at both sides of the Mediterranean basin. 
What are the consequences of this? And why is it important to keep this divergence 
in role conceptions in mind when analyzing EU-southern neighborhood relations?  
Conclusion 
This paper sought to answer the question to what extent the EU’s own perceived role 
in its southern neighborhood matches the role conception that those countries have 
for the EU. The analysis confirms that the EU indeed sees itself as a ‘force for good’ or 
norm promoter/defender in the southern Mediterranean region. However, only in 
Egypt the interviewees as well as the written press acknowledged this self-
conception of the EU, whereas in the case of Jordan and Algeria, the general 
feeling is that the EU sees itself first and foremost as a partner for security and stability 
in the region. In a second step, the paper also studied the role expectations that the 
EU’s southern neighbours have of the EU. Interestingly, in none of the cases, the EU’s 
self-proclaimed role as a partner in democratic reform figured on their wish lists. 
Instead, Algeria expects the EU primarily to be a reliable energy partner and a 
source of technical expertise and knowledge in order to make its economy more 
competitive. Egypt also looks to the EU in search for economic cooperation and 
further financial and technical support. Jordan, located in a precarious region with 
large influxes of refugees, is mainly concerned about its national security. It turns 
towards the EU in search of a political partner that helps the country to remain stable 
and safe and a partner who shares the (financial) burden of hosting hundred 
thousands of Arab refugees.  
Based on three case studies, one can thus conclude that there is a clear divergence 
in role conceptions between the EU and its southern partners. However, there might 
be some limitations linked to the research design applied. It is possible though that 
some conclusions on EU-Egypt, EU-Jordan or EU-Algeria relations are too (country) 
specific to generalize from, or subject to change on a fairly short notice as some of 
the countries (especially Egypt) might have different political and social outlooks 
and realties in the near future leading to different views and needs regarding the EU. 
Also, interviewing only people from within the European External Action Service might 
not capture the whole self-perception of the EU’s role in its southern neighborhood, 
nor might the views expressed by the various southern Mediterranean diplomats be 
widely shared by their colleagues. But in order to tackle these possible caveats, the 
gathered empirical information was cross-checked and complemented by data 
originating from various primary sources (such as the ENP formal documents) as well 
Joren Selleslaghs 
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as a limited amount of secondary literature, which tended to reaffirm and strengthen 
the views and arguments made during the interviews and media articles. For these 
reasons, the findings of the three case studies might be generalized towards the 
whole region and be used as a basis for further academic research.  
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